







O ~ ~~~~ oo~~~~
r r
i~i~iuiiiiiiiiiii~iiiu;idrimi~ii~i




OPTIMAL ABATENIENT POLICIES WITHIN A
STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM
Peter M. Kort -~.~..9~ yx
,,,~j ,,J v
FEW 516 ,., r, .~








Keywords: theory of the firm, investment, emissions tax, dynamic program-
ming
Abstract: In this paper a stochastic dynamic model of the firm, originally
developed by Bensoussan and Lesourne (1980), is used as a framework to
study the optimality of abatement investments. Production causes pollution
as an inevitable byproduct and in this model the latter is taxed by the
government. The firm can diminish these tax payments through reducing its
pollution output by carrying out abatement investments. It turns out that
abatement investment is never optimal when the governmental environmental
policy is weak, i.e. when the emissions tax rate is low, and that, when
the emissions tax is sufficiently high, abatement investment can only be
optimal when the expected marginal profitability of productive investment
is too small to justify additional growth and the amount of cash availably
high enough to guarantee a sufficiently strong liquidity position.2
1. INTliODUCTION
Nowadays, the improvement of environmental quality has become one of the
most important objectives in the industrialized world. From an economic
point of view one could argue that a non-polluted environment has become a
scarce commodity. Consequently, environmental use is an allocation problem
(Siebert (198~)) and should be taken into consideration by economic theo-
ry. This seems to be the reason that more and more books are devoted to
environmental economics (e.g. Baumol and Oates (1988), Wicke (1982)).
An important question in this respect is what kind of policy instruments
the government, in its role as social planner, should choose to reduce the
level of pollution. One class of instruments includes direct controls by
setting limits to specific elements. These restrictions are called stan-
dards which in practice can take many forms: restrictions on pollution
emissions, restrictions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an
input, restrictions on the output level, restrictions on the use of a
polluting input, or mandated use of a particular pollution-control techno-
logy. In Helfand (1991) the effects on the firm's decisions of each of
these standards are examined. According to Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw
(1991) the problem with standards is that they are difficult to enforce,
that they are associated with high administrative costs, and that they
lead to economic inefficiencies. Another possibility for the government to
reduce pollution is to impose an emissions tax rate. In Van der Ploeg and
De Zeeuw (1991) international aspects of such an emission charge are ana-
lyzed within a game theoretic framework, while in Kort, Van Loon and
Luptacik (1991) the reaction of the firm on such a measure is studied in a
deterministic dynamic setting.3
In this paper we extend the work of Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1991) by
introducing uncertainty into the analysis. To do so we incorporate activi-
ty analysis (see e.g. Takayama (1985)) into a stochastic dynamic model of
the firm developed by Bensoussan and Lesourne (1980) (see also Kort
(1989)). We consider two activities: the first one is productive but also
generates pollution that is taxed by the government. The second one is
non-productive but cleans pollution instead.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the stochastic
dynamic model of the firm, while in Section 3 the candidate policies for
optimality are inferred. In Section 4 the optimal behavior of the firm is
presented in cases of a weak, a moderate and a severe governmental envi-
ronmental policy. Section 5 concludes the paper and the Appendix contains
some mathematical proofs.
2. MODEL FORMULATION
In this-model the firm can invest in two different sorts of capital goods.
One is productive but also causes pollution as an inevitable byproduct.
The other one is non-productive but cleans pollution. We assume that pol-
lution is homogeneous by nature:
E(K1,K2) - e1K1 - e2K2
in which:
E(K1,K2) : amount of emissions being a function of K1 and K2
Ki - K1(t) : st.ock of productivc~ crjpitr[1 good5 r[f. t.imc t.
(1)4
K2 - K2(t) : stock of abatement capital goods at time t
el : emission to capital ratio of the productive capital
goods ( el ) 0 and constant)
e2 : abatement to capital ratio of the abatement capital
goods (e2 ) 0 and constant)
We suppose that the amount of earnings that is left after paying emissions
tax is stochastic and satisfies the following expression:l)
R(K1,K2)dt -{S(K1) - T(e1K1-e2K2)}{dt t cs dB} (2)
in which:
B- B(t) : standard Wiener process, where the increments dB(t) are
independent over time and normally distributed with
mean zero and variance dt
R(K1,K2) : net earnings (i.e. earnings net from emissions tax)
being a function of K1 and K2.
S(K1) : expected earnings before taxes when the stock of pro-
ductive capital goods equals K1, S(0) - 0, S'(K1) ) 0,
S"(K1) ~ 0
T : emissions tax rate (T ) 0 and constant)
6 : a cOnStant (Q ) 0)
1) The same expression can be found in Bensoussan and Lesourne (1980)
except that the emissions tax is missing there.5
The capital stocks are of the non-depreciating type and can be increased
by investment. Furthermore, it is assumed that the firm starts out without
having assigned any capital goods to the abatement activity yet. In this
way we obtain the following state equations for productive and abatement
capital stock:
dKi - Ildt, K1(0) ~ 0




I1 - I1(t) : rate of investment in productive capital goods at
time t
I2 - I2(t) : rate of investment in abatement capital goods at time
t
The firm is not able to borrow funds or issue new shares. Empirically
(cf. Sinn (1987)) issues of new shares have turned out to be a marginal
means of finance in postwar western economies. 1'he assumption of no borro-
wing is more restrictive since in practice debt is an important means of
finance. Admittedly, the reason for this assumption is mathematical conve-
nience but we suspect that the inclusion of borrowing would not lead to
dramatic changes of the results, qualitatively speaking. We return to this
~natter when we conclude the paper.
Besides investing in (non-)productive capital goods, the firm can also use
its net earnings to pay out dividend or to increase the cash balance.6
Further, we fix the value per unit of capital goods at one unit of money.
Taking these into account we obtain the third state equation of the model:
dM -{S(K1) - T(e1K1-e2K2) - I1 - I2 - D}dt t
~{S(K1) - T(e1K1-e2K2)}dB, M(0) ) 0 (5)
in which:
D- D(t) : rate of dividends at time t
M- M(t) : cash balance at time t
The firm behaves as if it maximizes the shareholders' value of the firm
which can be expressed as the mathematical expectation of the discounted
dividend stream over the planning period. Hence, the objective function
becomes:
T l
maximize ED f D exp(-it)dtl
0
in which:
T : horizon date
i: shareholders' time prefe-rence rate (i ) 0 and constar~r,)
(6)
Unlike most dynamic models, in the Bensoussan-Lesourne-framework the hori-
zon date T is endogenously determined such, that it equals bankruptcyï
time. We assume that the firm is bankrupt as soon as the cash balance
becomes negative, which is expressed in the following equation for the
horizon date:
T - inf{t~M(t) 5 0} (7)
Concerning this bankruptcy condition it is important to remark that capi-
tal goods cannot be sold to increase cash. This is because here invest-
ments are assumed to be irreversible (see e.g. Demers (1991), Pindyck
(1988)), meaning that the firm cannot disinvest, so the expenditures are
sunk costs. Irreversibility usually arises because capital is industry- or
firm-specific, that is, it cannot be used in a different industry or by a
different firm.
The assumption of irreversibility of investments and the nonnegativity of
the dividend rate are captured by the following inequalities:





It is assumed that the firm does not spend more on investment and dividend
than the expected net earnings:
(11)8
This is a reasonable rule, since the firm should consider that possible
profits arising from the positivity of the stochastic increment dB (cf.
(2)) may be changed into losses one moment later.
Of course it makes no sense that the amount of emissions becomes negative,
so we have to impose the following inequality:
E- e1K1 - e2K2 2 0 (12)
To summarize: the model contains three state variables K1, K2 and M, three
control variables I1, I2, and D, and can be expressed as follows:
T
maximize E J D exp(-it)dt
I1,I2,D ~ 0
dKl - Ildt, K1(0) ~ 0
dK2 - I2dt, K2(0) - 0




o{S(K1) - T(e1K1-e2K2)}dB, M(0) ) 0 (16)
e1K1 - e2K2 z 0





S(K1) - t(e1K1-e2K2) - I1 - I2 - D z 0 (21)
Finally, as an additional assumption we impose that at the start of the
planning period the firm's productive capital stock is that low (notice
that S"(K1) ( 0) that the expected increase in net earnings due to an
extra unit of K1 (i.e. S'(K1) - Tel) exceeds the emissions tax decrease
due to an extra unit of K2 (i.e. Te2) as well as the shareholders' time
preference rate:
S'(K1(0)) - Tel ~ max(ie2,i) (22)
3. CANDIDATE POLICIES FOR OPTIMALITY
To solve the model we use dynamic programming. Then the first step is to
define a vnlue function:
T




V(M,K1,K2) : value of the firm being a function of M, K1 and K210
V equals the expected discounted dividend stream during a time interval
that begins at an arbitrary instant t E[O,T] and ends at the horizon date
T. Because this horizon date depends completely on the value of M(cf.
(~)), we can conclude that V depends only on M, K1 and K2, and not expli-
citly on T.
Throughout the rest of the paper we assume that all partial derivatives of
first and second order exist. Now, we may derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bell-




~ VM{S(K1)-TE-I1-I2-D} t VK1I1 t VKZI21 t
1' 2 J
DtI1tI25S(K1)-TE
2 62{S(K1) - TE}2V~ (24)
The term between brackets can be maximized by comparing the values of VM,
VK and VK to each other and to 1. If VM, VK and VK are less than 1,
1 2 1 2
then the term between brackets reaches its maximum by putting D as high as
possible which can be done by equating I1 and I2 to zero and D to S(K1) -
TE. If VM is greater than the maximum of 1, VK and VK , then the term is
1 2
maximized by making S(K1) - 2E - I1 - I2 - D as high as possible, which
implies that I1, I2 and D must be zero. Further, it is optimal to equate
I1 to S(K1) - TE and D and I2 to zero if VK is greater than VM, VK and
1 2
1, and, similarly, if VK has the largest value then it is optimal to
2
equate i2 to S(K1) - TE and D and I1 to zero. In this way (24) can be
rewritten as:11
iV -{S(K1) - TE} max{1, VM, VK , VK } t 2 dz{S(K1) - TE}2VMM (25)
1 2
to which we adjoin the boundary condition:
V(0, K1, KZ) - 0 (26)
Depending on the relative size of 1, VM, VK and VK , the policies maximi-
1 2
zing the right-hand side of (25) differ. Four policies have to be con-
sidered, which can be economically interpreted since:
1 - the marginal profitability of an additional dollar used to increase
dividend
VM - the marginal increase of the value of the firm due to one extra
dollar kept in cash
VK - the marginal increase of the value of the firm due to an additional
1
productive investment of one dollar
VK - the marginal increase of the value of the firm due to an additional
2
abatement investment of one dollar.
The four policies can then be summarized by the following:
Cash policy: dM -{S(K1) - 2E}(dt t odB), D- I1 - I2 - 0
optimal if:
vM z max(1, vK , vK ) (27)
1 212
Due to (27) we can conclude that for this policy it is marginally better:
- to increase cash than to pay out dividend;
- to increase cash than to invest in productive capital goods;
- to increase cash than to invest in abatement capital goods.
Dividend policy: dM - 6{S(K1) - TE}dB, D- S(K1) - TE, I1 - I2 - 0
optimal if:
1 2 max(VM. VK . VK ) (28)
1 2
For this policy it is marginally better:
- to pay out dividend than to increase cash;
- to pay out dividend than to invest in productive capital goods;
- to pay out dividend than to invest in abatement capital goods.
Investment policy: dM - c{S(K1) - TE}dB, I1 - S(K1) - TE, D- I2 - 0
optimal if:
VK Z max(1, VM, VK )
1 2
(29)
For this policy it is marginally better:
- Lo invesL in productive cepital goods than to increase cash;
- to invest in productive capital goods than to pay out dividend;
- to invest in productive capital goods than to invest in abatement capi-
tal goods.13
Abatement policy: dM - 6{S(K1) - TE~dB, I2 - S(K1) - TE, D- I1 - 0
optimal if:
VK Z max(1, VM, VK )
2 1
(30)
For this policy it is marginally better:
- to invest in abatement capital goods than to increase cash;
- to invest in abatement capital goods than to pay out dividend;
- to invest in abatement capital goods than to invest in productive capi-
tal goods.
As already stated in the beginning of this section the value of the firm V
only depends on M, K1 and K2 and not on t. Then the same holds, of course,
for the partical derviatives VM, VK and VK . Now, we can conclude from
1 2
the conditions (2~) through (30) that it completely depends on the values
of the staY.e variables M, K1 and K2 which of the four policies is optimal
for the firm to carry out. Hence, in what follows we try to establish for
which values of M, K1 and K2 which policy is optimal. To so so, we have to
divide the M-K1-K2 space in four regions, each of them belonging to one of
the four candidates for an optimal policy, which are collections of those
values of M, K1 and K2 for which the corresponding policy is optimal. In
this way we get the following regions: investment-region, cash-region,
dividend-region and abatement-region. In what follows these regions will
be denoted by I1-region, M-region, D-region and I2-region, respectively.14
4. SOLUTION
We study this problem for different scenarios. Each scenario is characte-
rízed by a different set of values for: shareholders' time preference
rate, the parameter v(cf. (2)), abatement to capital rate and emissions
tax rate. In this paper we will consider only those scenarios under which
the solutions with the most realistic properties arise. Mathematically
this means that we take the following two inequations as starting-point
for the remaining analysis (in the sequel we explain in footnotes what
happens when (31) and (32) do not hold):
l~i-6~~~0 (31)
{S'(0) - Tel}(l~i - a~~ - p) ) 1 (32)
ín which:
p: a constant which satisfies:
exp{(rl-r2)p} - {1 - r2(l~i - 6~~)}~{1 - rl(l~i - 6~~)} (33)
in which:
rl - (-1 t 1t2a2i)~62




Now we are ready to formulate our first proposition.
Proposition 1
Under condition (31) only the M-region can include the K1-K2 plane where
M - 0.2)
Proof.
Follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 1 in Kort (1989, Ch. 4)
and is therefore omitted.
4.1. OptimaZ firm behavíor under a roeak envíronmental policy of the go-
vernment
Here we analyze a scenario for which the following condition holds:
Te2 C i (36)
Hence, we assume for the moment that the emissions tax rate is relatively
low.
One extra unit of abatement investment (which costs one dollar) decreases
the amount of emissions by e2 implying that the emissions tax to be paid
-------------------------------------------------------
2) In case (31) does not hold it can be proved (cf. Kort (1989)) that a
Dividend policy is better than a Cash policy. Economically this could be
interpreted by saying that now the earnings level is so uncertain, i.e. v
is relatively high when the sign of inequality (31) is reversed, that the
firm still has a fair chance of going bankrupt when it carries out a Cash
policy. Therefore, shareholders prefer to obtain dividends immediately
before bankruptcy actually occurs. This statement can also be explained by
observing that the shareholders' time preference rate is relatively high,
implying that immediate obtainment of dividends is attractive, when the
sign of inequality (31) is reversed.16
by the firm decreases with the amount Te2. Hence, the marginal value of
abatement investment equals te2. One extra dollar dividend pay out can be
used by the shareholders to invest outside the firm, generating a return
of i. As the firm maximizes the shareholders' value of the firm, we can
conclude that the firm always assigns a higher value to dividend pay out
than to abatement investments when condition (36) holds. Therefore, the
Dividend policy will always dominate the Abatement policy and, consequent-
ly, the firm will never carry out an Abatement policy when the governmen-
tal environmental policy is weak.
The above implies that there will be no abatement investments, so the
stock of abatement capital remains zero throughout the whole planning
period (cf. (4)). Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to the problem of
dividing the M-Ki plane into an I1-region, a M-region and a D-region.
Except that their contents and proofs are slightly adjusted for the pre-
sence of activity analysis and emissions tax, the following propositions
and their proofs also hold for the original Bensoussan-Lesourne model
without these extensions. Therefore, we only present these propositions
and for their proofs refer to Kort (1989), in which the Bensoussan-
Lesourne model is extensively treated.
Proposition 2
The boundary between the M-region and the D-region can be expressed as
M- p{S(Ki) - T(eiKi-e2K2)}, where p is given by (33).
Proposition 3
The boundary between the Ii-region and the D-region increases in the M-Ki
plane (K2 being constant) and lies below a horizontal asymptote which issituated on the level Ki, determined by S'(Ki) - Tel - i. The D-region
lies at the left-hand side of this boundary.
At the intersection point ( M,K1) of the boundary between the I1-region and
the D-region and the boundary between the M-region and the D-region it
mu5t hold that {S'(K1) - Tel}(l~i - o~~ - p) - 1.3)
Proposition 4
In the M-K1 plane the boundary between the I1-region and the M-region
starts at the origin and ends at the intersection point (M,K1) of the
boundaries between the M-region and the D-region and between the I1-region
and the D-region.
Notice, that we already concluded that K2 will always be zero under condi-
tion (36) so that in this subsection we consider the above propositions
for K2 - 0. Now, the contents of the Propositions 1-4 can be transformed
into the solution as depicted in Figure 1.
[place Figure 1 about here]
This solution has the same configuration as one of the solutions of the
Bensoussan-Lesourne model without activity analysis and emissions tax (see
Kort (1989), Figure 4.1)). Resemblances are that the firm increases cash
if the cash balance is low, it invests if the stock of capital goods is
3) Notice that if the sign of inequality (32) is reversed, then the inter-
section point (M,K1) does not exist. This implies that it becomes optimal
to pay out dividend for very low values of K1. In reality such a policy
can only be observed in exceptional situations (cf. Kort (1989), p. 87).18
low and it pays out dividends if both the cash balance and the stock of
capital goods are high enough.
A first difference is that in this model the horizontal asymptote of the
boundary between the I1-region and the D-region is situated on the level
Ki, which satisfies S'(Ki) -~rel - i (cf. Proposition 3), while in the
Bensoussan-Lesourne model this asymptote corresponds to K~, which satis-
fies S'(K~) - i. For both situations the economic interpretation is simi-
lar: the firm never carries out an Investment policy if the expected mar-
ginal earnings (after emissions tax) fall below the return that the share-
holders can obtain outside the firm, which is equal to i. This actually
happens at the moment that K is above the asymptote (to understand this
remember that S" ( 0). Furthermore, we can conclude that in the present
model the asymptote corresponds to a lower level of the stock of capital
goods, implying a smaller investment-region. Hence, investing becomes less
attractive to the firm which can be declared by the fact that now invest-
ment is less profitable due to the emissions taxation costs.
A second difference is that here the cash-dividend boundary equals
M- p{S(K1) -~re1K1} (cf. Proposition 2 for K2 - 0) and in the Bensoussan-
Lesourne model this boundary is expressed by M- pS(K). This implies that
in the present model a Dividend policy is more popular to the firm than a
Cash policy compared to the Bensoussan-Lesourne model. The reason is that
in this model the cash situation is negatively influenced by the presence
of emissions tax, implying a greater risk for the firm to go bankrupt (cf.
(7)). Therefore, the shareholders want to obtain dividend as soon as po5-
sible. They are less interested in increasing the cash balance first be-
cause of the increased risk of' t,he firm going bankrupt bef'ore the dividend
payout starts.19
The overall conclusion is that the presence of emissions tax negatively
influences the economic prospects of the firm and therefore the sharehol-
ders are less interested in building up the firm first, i.e. increasing
the stock of capital goods and the cash balance, before demanding any
dividends. So, an immediate obtainment of dividends becomes more popular
implying an increased D-region. The latter is confirmed by the fact that,
compared to the Bensoussan-Lesourne model, here the central intersectíon
point (M,K1) has lower values for the stocks of cash and capital goods.
Because now M and K1 are fixed by the equalities M- p{S(K1) - ze1K1} and
{S'(K1) - iel}(l~i - 6~~ - p) - 1 ( cf. Proposition ( 3)), while in the
Bensoussan-Lesourne model ( K,M) is determined by M- pS(K) and S'(K)(l~i -
6~~ - P) - 1.
4.2. Optimal firm behavior under a moderate environmental policy of the
government
In this subsection it is assumed that the parameters satisfy the following
inequalities:
Ye2 ) i (37)
Te2(l~i - a~~ - p) ~ 1 (38)
Comparing (36) and (37) we conclude that here governmental environmental
policy will have a stronger influence than in the solution oF the previous
subsection. Because of (37) the Abatement policy is no longer dominated by
the Dividend policy implying that now we must try to find out where the20
I2-region is situated in the M-K1-K2 space. Let us concentrate first on
the boundary between the I1-region and the I2-region. This boundary con-
sists of a collection of points in the M-K1-K2 space, which have in common
that investments in productive capital goods and in abatement capital
goods have the same (expected) profitability. The marginal expected net
earnings of productive investment equal S'(K1) - Tel, while Te2 is the
marginal tax decrease of abatement investment. Hence, on the boundary
between the I1-region and the I2-region K1 must be constant, say KI, such
that it satisfies:
S'(K1) - Tel - Te2 (39)
The properties of the boundary between the IZ-region and the D-region are
formulated in the following proposition:
Proposition 5
The boundary between the I2-region and the D-region has the following
properties:
1. (K1,M) (cf. Proposition 3) is not situated on the I2~D-boundary.
2. (39) is a necessary condition for the I2~D-boundary to intersect the
I1~D-boundary.
3. The I2~D-boundary increases in the K1-M plane for K2 fixed.
4. For the I2~D-boundary it holds that: Kl -~ m e~ M-~ m.
5. The I2-region is situated at the right-hand side of this boundary.
Proof
See Appendix.21
In Figure 2 the solution is depicted in case that K2 - 0. The correctness
of this solution can be verified by checking that the Propositions 1-5 are
satisfied and that the I1~I2-boundary is given by (39).
[place Figure 2 about here]
Compared to Figure 1, the big difference is that Figure 2 contains a re-
gion where it is optimal to carry out an Abatement policy. Apparently such
s policy can only be optimal if productive capital stock is that large
that the marginal emissions tax decrease resulting from an abatement in-
vestment is higher than the expected earnings due to marginal productive
investment. Furthermore the stock of cash must be high enough to guarantee
a sufficiently strong liquidity position. Remarkable is that the I2-region
is situated at the right of the D-region.
Notice that, due to (3~), we could think that, opposite to the situation
in Subsection 3.1, the Abatement policy dominates the Dividend policy. But
we have to remember that the objective of the firm is to maximize the
expected discounted dividend stream. Hence it could be dangerous to post-
pone paying out dividend by, for instance, carrying out abatement invest-
ments first, because in the mean time bankruptcy could occur and then the
shareholders get nothing. Therefore carrying out an Abatement policy only
turns out to be optimal when the bankruptcy risk is limited, i.e. when the
stock of cash is high.
Figure 2 actually holds at time-point zero, because the firm starts out
with a stock of abatement capital being zero. Also it holds that the pro-
n
ductive capital stock is less than K1 (cf. (22), (39)) at the start of the
planning period. The I2-region is situated above K1 implying that K2 can22
n
only increase at the moment that K1 becomes at least as high as K1. In the
following proposition it is stated in what way the configuration in the
K1-M plane changes when K2 increases.
Proposition 6
When K2 increases the configuration of the regions in the K1-M plane chan-
ges in the following way compared to Figure 2:
1. the M~D-boundary shifts to the right;
2. (M,K) shifts to the right;
3. the I1~D-boundary shifts to the right;
4. the I2~D-boundary shifts to the right;
Proof
See Appendix.
The results stated in Proposition 6 can be explained as follows: due to an
increase in the stock of abatement capital emissions are reduced resulting
in a reduced payment of emissions tax by the firm. Therefore the firm is
more able to prevent bankruptcy whích explains that the Cash policy be-
comes more popular when the stock of abatement capital increases. This
causes an expansion of the M-region and through this swelling the other
regions are pushed to the right.
Carrying out abatement investments only make sense as long as there is
something to abate, i.e. as long as the amount of emissions is positive.
Whc~n thís amount becomes zero the stHte constraint (12) becomes binding
and a further increase of abatement capital stock is not possible.23
Suppose the firm is in the I2-region and K2 reaches its upperbound, resul-
ting from emissions becoming zero, for the first time. Due to the facts
that the firm starts out with a productive capital stock being less than
K1 (cf. (22), (39)), that above K1 the firm never carries out productive
n
investments, when (12) is not binding, and below K1 there is no abatement-
region (cf. Figure 2), the stock of productive capital then exactly equals
K1. It is not possible to perform an Abatement policy so the firm has to
choose between the other three policies. In the I2-region it holds that
M ~ p{S(K1) - T(e1K1-e2K2)}, implying that it is always better to pay out
dividend than to increase cash (cf. Proposition 2). Therefore, at the
moment that emissions become zero in the I2-region the firm will make a
choice between investing in productive capital stock and paying out divi-
dend. If K1 equals K1 the firm will without doubt choose for productive
investment, because marginal expected net earnings of productive invest-
ment (S'(K) - 2e1) then equal marginal earnings of abatement investment
(2e2, cf. (39)) and the latter should be the best policy if emissions were
not zero. As a result of productive investment K1 increases, implying that
the amount of emissions turn positive which means that abatement invest-
ments are allowed again. Investment in abatement capital stops when emis-
sions again become zero. Then for the second time the firm must choose
between productive investment and dividend pay out. Given the fact that
the D~I1-boundary increases in the K1-M plane where the D-region is situa-
ted at the left and the I1-region at the right of this boundary (cf. Pro-
position 3), the firm prefers to invest as long as the stock of cash is
sufficiently large. This alternating investment~abatement behavior can go
on for some time and in this way we obtain a mixed Investment~Abatement
policy. Notice that if the stock of cash remains to be sufficiently large24
the stock of productive capital goods will ultimately reach Ki~ that sa-
tísfies:
e2
e te S~(K1~) - 1
1 2
(40)
Ki~ is determined such that the expected extra profit arísing from the
application of an additional capital good exactly equals the shareholders'
time preference rate. Namely, from this capital good e2~(elte2) is as-
signed to activity 1, implying an expected return of
S'(Ki~)e2,(el}e2),
and el~(elfe2) to activity 2(this division is the result of solving two
equations with two unknowns: taking into consideration one additional
capital good implies that ~K1t~K2 - 1 and having no pollution results in
e10K1 - e2~K2). This equality between expected marginal return to capital
goods and shareholders' time preference rate implies that at this stage
the firm preferes paying out dividend instead of productive investments.
Hence, the stock of productive capital remains constant at the level Ki"
and therefore emissions remain zero, so further investment in abatement
capital makes no sense. T'his implies that the only policy left is the
Dividend policy. The above story is depicted in Figure 3.
[place Figure 3 about here]
If the assumption "M sufficiently large" is dropped we must study Figure 3
in connection with Figure 2. From Figure 2 we obtain that for K1 ~ K1 the
I1-policy is replaced by the M-policy if the stock of cash becomes suffi-
ciently low, and for K~ K1 the policies depicted in Figure 3 are replaced25
by the D-policy for intermediate values of M and by the M-policy for low
values of M.
4.3. Optimal firm behavior under a strong environmental policy of the
government
Here, the firm's optimal policy is studied under the following parameter
constraint:
Te2(l~i - 6~~ - p) ) 1 (41)
Comparing (38} and (41) we conclude that in this subsection the marginal
decrease of emissions tax due to abatement investment has become larger
relative to the shareholders' time preference rate and the parameter 6
(this is true because p is a function of i and o(cf. (33)-(35)) and by
tedious calculations (see Kort (1988), Appendix 2) it can be shown that
both the signs of the derivatives from p to i and 6 are not clearly posi-
tive or negative).
Now, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition ~




If M goes to infinity, K1 and K2 are finite and the state constraint (12)
is not binding, it cannot be optimal for the firm to pay out dividend.
Proof
See Appendix.
Like in the solution of the previous subsection also here the I1~I2-boun-
dary will be situated at the level K1 - K1, where K1 is given by (39).
Below K1 marginal expected earnings of productive capital is greater than
the marginal tax decrease of abatement capital and above K1 the reverse is
true. From Proposition ~ we obtain that the D-region is not directly boun-
ded to the M-region. Therefore we can conclude that in the K1-M plane the
M-region is directly connected to the I1-region if K1 ~ K1 and for K1 ) K1
the M~I2-boundary exists.
17ie contents of Propositions ~ and 8 do suggest that there is no D-region
at all. This can be economically explained by the fact that, as stated
before, expression (41) implies that the shareholders' time preference
rate and the parameter 6 have rather low values compared to the emissions
tax decrease caused by a marginal investment in abatement capital. A low
value of the shareholders' time preference rate means that there is no
rush for immediate dividend pay out, so there is time to carry out produc-
tive and abatement investment first. A low value of a implies that ear-
nings are rather certain which means that bankruptcy risk is not so high.
Hence, unlike in the solution of Subsection 3.2, here there is no need to
be afraid that postponing dividend pay out is dangerous because of the
fact that the occurrence of bankruptcy then implies that the shareholdersget nothing. Therefore, as long as emissions are positive, we expect that
the Dividend policy is completely dominated by the Abatement policy. No-
tice that also here it holds that ie2 ~ i.
The above story is depicted in Figure 4. Unfortunately we have to state
that we were not able to prove mathematically that there is no D-region at
all. The Propositions 7 and 8 are still satisfied if in Figure 4 a D-re-
gion occurs somewhere between the M-region and M being infinite. But, due
to the fact that we cannot think of an economic reason for such a D-re-
gion, we skipped it in Figure 4.
[place Figure 4 about here]
Of course, the solution can also be drawn in the K1-K2 plane. For M suffi-
ciently large also here Figure 3 applies with the only difference that
under conditíon (41) K1 (cf. Proposition 3) is greater than K1. Of course
if the assumption "M sufficiently large" is dropped Figure 3 has to be
read in connection with Figure 4. So, the policies depicted in Figure 3
can be interrupted at any time by the need to raise the stock of cash
through an M-policy if M decreases such that (K1,M) goes to the left of
the I1~M-boundary or the I2~M-boundary.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper is to study the optímality of abatement investments
within an uncertain environment. To reach this aim we extended a stochas-
tic model of Bensoussan and Lesourne (1980) by incorporating activity28
analysis. We considered two activities: the first one is productive but
also causes pollution that is taxed by the government. The second one is
non-productive but abates pollution so that tax payments are reduced.
The problem was modelled as a dynamic model of the firm. Models belonging
to this category attempt to describe a firm, in broad terms and over its
entire lifetime, with respect to basic characteristics such as its objec-
tive, production technology and financial structure. Taking primarily a
normative point of view, the theory attempts to derive optimal time paths
for key decision variables of the firm such as investment in productive
capital, employment and dividend policy. One of the main purposes of
designing and analyzing dynamic models of the firm is to develop a theore-
tical background for managerial policies. An extensive survey of the area
of "The Dynamics of the Firm" is provided by J~rgensen (1991).
It turned out that investments in the abatement activity can be optimal
when the following conditions are satisfied:
- the firm has a strong liquidity position;
- the reduction in emissions tax due to an additional abatement investment
must be greater or equal than the shareholders' time preference rate and
the expected marginal net earnings of productive investment.
Of course we have to keep in mind that the above conclusions only hold
under the assumptions of the model. For instance, in our quest to obtain
analytical results we left financing possibilities like borrowing and
issuing new shares aside by assuming that the firm can finance its
investments only by retained earnings. However, as stated in Section 2,
issuing new shares is not an important means of finance in real life.
Concerning borrowing possibilities we refer to Bensoussan and Lesourne29
(1981) in which, like in the present paper, the self-financing model of
Bensoussan and Lesourne (1980) was used as a departure-point. But, while
we incorporated activity analysis to gain insights on environmental poli-
cies, they incorporated debt to study the implications of borrowing. They
concluded that borrowing may be optimal for three reasons: to increase
permanently the size of the firm's equipment, to accelerate the growth of
the firm and~or to avoid bankruptcy by improving the cash situation. Com-
paring these results with our conditions for optimality of abatement in-
vestments, we may suspect that these conditions will not be affected,
qualitatively speaking, when the model is extended to allow for borrowing.APPENDIX
Proof of Propositton 5
Due to (25) and (28) we obtain that in the D-region it holds that:
iV - S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2) f a2{S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)}2VMM
(A.1)
Solving this differential equation leads to:
V - {S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)}~i t
cl(K1,K2) exp[M~~6{S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)}] t
c2(K1,K2) exp[-M~~a{S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)}] (A.2)
in which:
cl(K1,K2) and c2(K1,K2) are arbitrary functions.
Since from an economic point of view it is unlikely that the value of the
firm increases or decreases exponentially when M increases, while keeping
K1 and K2 constant, we put cl(K1,K2) equal to zero.
We now turn to the five properties:31
Proof of property 1
From Proposition 3 we obtain that K1 satisfies:
S'(K1) - Tel - 1~(l~i - 6~~ - P)
From ( 38) we get:
Te2 ~ 1~(l~i - 6~~ - P)
(A.3)
(A.4)
Now, from ( A.3) and ( A.4) we can conclude that in (K1,M) the expected
marginal profitability of productive investment (S'(K1) - Tel) exceeds the
profitability of one dollar abatement i nvestment ( Te2). Hence carrying out
abatement investments will never be optimal in the direct neighbourhood of
(K1,M), which leads to the conclusion that the I2~D-boundary does not
intersect this point.
Hence the I2-region is not situated near (K1,M) which implies that in the
direct neighbourhood of this point the solution is the same as in Fi-
gure 1. Thus we have a M~D-boundary given by (cf. Proposition 2):
M - p{S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)} (A,5)
Due to the fact that on the M~D-boundary it also holds that VM - 1(becau-
se (27) and (28) must both be satisfied) we can obtain from (A.2) and the
fact that we already put cl(K1,K2) equal to zero (cf. Bensoussan and Le-
sourne (1980) p. 265):32
c2(KI.K2) - cs{S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)}exp(P ~)~~ (A.6)
If' we substitute cl(K1,K2) - 0 and (A.6) into (A.2) we obtain for the
D-region:
V - {S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)}
(l~i - 6 exPL(P - M~{S(K1) - T(e1K1 - e2K2)})~Ie~I~) (A.7)
Proof of property 2
From (A.7) we obtain:







K 2 i ~ S(K )-T(e K-e K) eXp P- S(K )-T(e K-e K) o V2-~e f-- {~; 1 11 22} [ 1 11 22]-~)
(A.9)
At the intersection point of the I2~D-boundary and the I1~D-boundary it
must hold that VK - VK - 1. Now we can immediately conclude from (A.8)
1 2
rrnd (A.9) Lhat property 2 is valid.33
Proof of property 3
From (A.9) we get:
VK M - ie2M~~16{S(K1) - T(e1K1-e2K2)}2J 2 LLL














From (A.10) we derive that VK increases if M increases. On the whole
2
I2~D-boundary it must hold that VK - 1, so if M increases and we keep K2
2
constant we have to find a K1 which cancels the increase in VK due to M.
1
From (A.11) we can conclude that VK decreases if K1 increases. Hence. on
2
the boundary a higher level of M corresponds to a higher level of K1,
given that KZ is kept constant, and therefore the boundary is an increa-
sing function in the M-K1 plane.
Proof of property 4
We study two cases:
1. M~ m, K1 being finite:now, we obtain from (36) and (A.9):
VK - Te2~i ) 1
2
(A.12)
Hence, because on the I2~D-boundary it holds that VK - 1, we conclude
2
from (A.12) that if M goes to infinity K1 cannot have a finite value on
the I~~D-boundary.
2. K1 ~ m, M being finite:
now, (36) and (A.9) lead to:
VK2 - ~e2~i - ~ exp ~p ~JJ
) 1 (A.13)
So, if K1 goes to infinity on the I2~D-boundary then M cannot have a
finite value.
From the analysis of the above two cases we derive the validity of proper-
ty 4.
Proof of property 5
From (A.10) we obtain that in the D-region VK increases if M increases.
2
For a Dividend policy to be optimal it must hold that VK C 1. And because
2
at the I2~D-boundary it holds that VK - 1 we conclude that property 5 is
2
valid.35
Proof of Proposttion 6
Proof of property 1
Follows directly from the expression of this boundary (cf. Proposition 2)
Proof of property 2
Follows directly from the expression of this point (cf. Proposition 3).
Proof of property 3
At this boundary it holds that VK - 1. From (A.8) we obtain:
1
~ {S'(K1)-Tel}M
VK1M - o {S(K1)-t(e1K1-e2K2)}2
M l ~
exp p - S(K1)-T(e1K1-e2K2)J
~ ~ 0 (A.14)
From (A.11) we already know that VK K( 0. Hence, when KZ increases VK
1 2 1
decreases. To keep VK equal to 1 M must be increased.
1
Proof of property 4





(A.15) exp (p -
S(K1)-T(e1K1-e2K2)J
6 ~ 036
From (A.10) we obtain that VK M~ 0. Hence when keeping K1 constant and K2
2
increases also M must increase to keep VK equal to 1.
2
Proof of Proposítion 7
If the M~D-boundary exists it is given by (cf. Proposition 2);
M - p{S(K1) - T(e1K1-e2K2)} (A.16)
Then in the D-region the value of the firm is given by (A.~) and from this
expression we obtain:
1 6 M
VK2 - Te2 i- ~ f S(K1)-T(e1K1-e2K2)




After substitution of (A.16) into ( A.1~) we obtain the value of VK on the
2
M~D-boundary:
1 6 - p - Te -
K2 2 i ~ (A.18)
Now, from (40) and (A.18) we obtain that on the M~D-boundary it holds that
VK ) 1, which implies that here a Dividend policy cannot be optimal
2
(cf. (28)). hence under condition (40) the M~D-boundary does not exist.37
Proof of Proposftfon 8
Due to (A.2) and the fact that we have put cl(K1,K2) equal to zero (see
below (A.2)) we have the following expression for the value of the firm in
the D-region.




From this equation we derive:
Te2 ~c2 Te2~M c2(K1,K2)






Due to (A.20) we can conclude that VK ) 1 if M goes to infinity and, due
2
to (28), this implies that a Dividend policy can not be optimal.
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